Elon Musk’s Starlink row in India exposes Asia’s deeper battle over satellite power

Elon Musk’s Starlink row in India exposes Asia’s deeper battle over satellite power

Additional points:

Q1. What do you think are the reasons for the delays in Musk’s launch plans in India? Do you agree with his statement about oligarchs obstructing his entry?

The delays in India primarily stem from complex regulatory requirements, including finalizing spectrum pricing, obtaining security clearances, and complying with data localization mandates. While Musk blames “oligarchs” for protecting monopolies, this oversimplifies the situation. Domestic telecom operators understandably advocate for a level playing field to ensure satellite internet doesn’t gain undue regulatory advantages over terrestrial networks. India’s methodical approach reflects a sovereign state establishing equitable telecommunications rules. From a pragmatic standpoint, framing this as a billionaire conspiracy ignores the rigorous policy processes necessary in major markets. Navigating these regulatory guardrails is simply a standard cost of doing business globally.

Q2. Do you think there are genuine security concerns about his proposal since several other nations, including Sri Lanka, Nepal, Vietnam, Taiwan, and China, have actively opposed or been slow to grant approvals to Starlink?

Yes, the security concerns are entirely genuine. Satellite networks bypass traditional terrestrial infrastructure, raising valid flags regarding data sovereignty, surveillance, and national defense. For Asian governments, allowing foreign-controlled critical communications infrastructure to operate outside direct regulatory oversight is a non-starter. States require concrete guarantees that domestic user data remains localized and that authorities retain crisis management capabilities. These regional delays are not anti-innovation roadblocks; they are standard sovereign prerogatives. Protecting national security in an era of borderless technology is a baseline expectation, and governments are right to prioritize sovereign control over rapid deployment.

Q3. What do those concerns mean for Starlink’s expansion plans in Asia, which has emerged at the forefront of technology development and adoption?

These regulatory hurdles mean Starlink’s Asian expansion will be a marathon, not a sprint. Although Asia is a primary engine of tech adoption, it has a heavily fragmented regulatory landscape. Starlink cannot impose a one-size-fits-all global model or expect special exemptions. Expansion will require market-by-market negotiations, balancing SpaceX’s operational model with stringent local compliance. The rollout will inevitably be slower and more capital-intensive, requiring investments in local ground stations and domestic partnerships. Ultimately, achieving scale in Asia will depend on Starlink’s willingness to adapt to the region’s strict regulatory frameworks rather than attempting to bypass them.

Q4. What does Musk need to do to address these concerns?

Musk must pivot from confrontational rhetoric to collaborative diplomacy. Publicly blaming local stakeholders on social media is counterproductive in Asia, where government relations demand tact and respect for regulatory sovereignty. To build essential trust, Starlink must proactively demonstrate compliance. This means guaranteeing strict data localization, establishing accountable domestic legal entities, and pursuing joint ventures with local telecom operators instead of antagonizing them. Demonstrating transparency in data handling and a genuine willingness to operate quietly within national frameworks will be far more effective in unlocking Asian markets than airing public grievances. Quiet compliance wins over loud disruption here.

 

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Elon Musk’s accusation that powerful Indian business interests are blocking Starlink’s entry into India has sparked a political row, but analysts say the dispute also highlights security concerns, regulatory hurdles and strategic calculations shaping the satellite service’s expansion across Asia.

In a post on social media, Musk said Starlink was licensed in more than 165 countries and had spent five years complying with Indian laws and regulations.

“So why still no licence? Is Ambani the real boss of India?” he wrote, suggesting Reliance Group chairman Mukesh Ambani – one of India’s wealthiest tycoons whose sprawling conglomerate has a major footprint across the economy – might wield undue influence over the licensing process.
The post drew a sharp response from Rahul Gandhi, leader of India’s main opposition party. “Welcome to India, Elon. Wait till you discover the other guy,” Gandhi said, apparently referring to Gautam Adani, another prominent Indian billionaire whose infrastructure and energy empire has expanded rapidly in recent years.
Gandhi has frequently accused Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government and its ruling Bharatiya Janata Party of favouring Ambani and Adani.

The Indian government said its regulatory framework for satellite communication services was fair and non-discriminatory.

Raj Kapoor, president of the India Blockchain Alliance, said Musk’s accusation overlooked the intense scrutiny Starlink was likely to face from security regulators across Asia.

“It is a foreign-controlled satellite network with the ability to provide connectivity across political borders and potentially bypass conventional terrestrial telecommunications infrastructure,” Kapoor said, adding that Indian security agencies had been scrutinising infrastructure localisation and whether user traffic could be routed outside domestic jurisdiction.

“Calling this an oligarch conspiracy is good politics on X but a poor reading of what is actually happening,” Kapoor said, pointing to past seizures of Starlink terminals from separatist militants in India’s Manipur state and from a drug-smuggling vessel off the coast. “That tells a security agency that the network can be reached by people the state cannot see.”

Starlink’s regional expansion has run into regulatory hurdles, security concerns and geopolitical resistance in several Asian countries, including Vietnam, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Nepal.

Kapoor said the regulatory concerns differed across jurisdictions and should not be generalised.

Starlink’s launch in Sri Lanka faced delays over regulatory assessments, data monitoring processes and national security vetting before receiving approval in mid-2025. In Vietnam, it launched nationwide operations in August under a tightly controlled five-year pilot programme.

Globally, Starlink has expanded rapidly across more than 160 countries, serving millions of customers.

“One of the reasons for the rapid expansion of Starlink has been how quickly countries have licensed it,” said Simon Baker, a UK-based senior research director for satellite and non-terrestrial connectivity at market research firm IDC.

“The service offers productivity gains to many services with poor telecoms infrastructure and this has encouraged them to overlook security issues for the time being. However, as Starlink use grows, the conditions imposed on it could increase in many places,” Baker added.

Anndy Lian, a Singapore-based technology policy adviser to governments, said security concerns among Asian countries were “entirely genuine” because satellite networks bypass land-based infrastructure, raising questions over data sovereignty, surveillance and national defence.

“States require concrete guarantees that domestic user data remains localised and that authorities retain crisis management capabilities,” Lian said. “These regional delays are not anti-innovation roadblocks; they are standard sovereign prerogatives. India’s methodical approach reflects a sovereign state establishing equitable telecommunications rules.”

The delays facing Starlink’s application in India stemmed mainly from complex regulatory requirements, Lian added.

India’s telecommunications market is currently dominated by Reliance Jio Infocomm and Bharti Airtel, which together control more than 80 per cent of the market. Reliance is expanding its own satellite ambitions through Jio Satellite Communications and a joint venture with Luxembourg-based satellite operator SES.

While OneWeb and Starlink are among the providers granted preliminary satellite communications licences in India, none has yet received spectrum allocation or launched full commercial services.

The government said that all applicants must undergo mandatory security assessments before spectrum allocation.

An uneven landscape

Jamus Lim, an associate professor of economics at ESSEC Business School Asia-Pacific, said that India’s market structure was heavily concentrated among a small group of large companies.

“Under such an industrial organisation, it is not unusual for foreign entrants to find the competitive conditions less than ideal,” Lim said, noting that entering a market dominated by established players was always difficult, regardless of an entrant’s technological advantage.

The dispute between Musk and New Delhi also reflects growing geopolitical overlay in economic policymaking.

“It does not help that the Indian government has had its own share of friction with the United States,” Lim said.

India has indicated that trade negotiations with the United States have largely stalled, with its willingness to make further concessions to Washington reaching a limit. US lawmakers have also enacted sanctions legislation authorising discretionary tariffs of up to 100 per cent on major buyers of Russian oil, a move aimed partly at India’s continued energy trade with Moscow.

Lim noted that while Musk’s companies had “deep pockets” they should “expect no favours from Indian policymakers”.

Despite regulatory hurdles, proponents argue that Starlink offers significant benefits to Asian economies by delivering high-speed digital connectivity to remote and disaster-prone regions.

But Lian said that Starlink’s Asia-wide roll-out “will be a marathon, not a sprint”.

Kapoor predicted a segmented roll-out across the region: while some Asian countries would adopt Starlink rapidly, others would impose strict localisation rules, and a third group would pursue domestic or allied satellite alternatives.

“India does not want to exchange dependence on one set of telecoms gatekeepers for dependence on a foreign satellite network,” Kapoor said. “It wants the benefits of Starlink without surrendering strategic autonomy.”

Satya Gupta, president of the VLSI Society of India and a veteran telecoms industry executive, said the controversy highlighted the need for India to develop its own satellite service.

“We should aim to have this over the next five to seven years. This is the future of the internet for a range of services,” Gupta said. “We have all the ingredients and we need to put it together.”

India has already emerged as a major global hub for low-cost small satellite manufacturing and cost-effective space projects. Gupta said India could develop its own satellite services and offer them to regional neighbours, including Sri Lanka and Nepal.

 

Source: https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3370206/india-aims-anchor-military-ties-us-indo-pacific-resident-power?module=perpetual_scroll_1_RM&pgtype=article

 

Anndy Lian is an early blockchain adopter and experienced serial entrepreneur who is known for his work in the government sector. He is a best selling book author. The latest book is Web4: The Age of Autonomous Intelligence.

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India’s push to secure place in global chip supply has ‘secret weapon’: its people

India’s push to secure place in global chip supply has ‘secret weapon’: its people
India is betting big on domestic manufacturing of semiconductors – the microscopic brains that power everything electronic from cars to AI processing – in an ambitious bid to slash imports and boost its local industry.

But observers say the country should set its sights even higher upstream on the value chain by mobilising its “secret weapon” – a talent pool that could realise its dream to turn “Make in India” into “Engineer in India”.

New Delhi earlier this week launched the second phase of its mission with a budget of US$13 billion to build an industrial ecosystem spanning chip design to manufacturing. Building on the first phase, which focused heavily on foundational industrial set-up, the second expands support across the entire supply chain, including developing a large manpower pool.

The move on Monday comes as other countries in the region, such as Japan and Singapore, outline multibillion-dollar development plans for their semiconductor industries following chip shortages during the Covid-19 pandemic that exposed dependency on a handful of East Asian manufacturers.

Delhi has already approved 12 semiconductor manufacturing projects across six states. Three – Micron, Keynes Semicon and CG Semi – have started commercial production this year. They primarily handle assembly, testing and packaging rather than advanced wafer fabrication.

An industrial partnership between India’s Tata Electronics and Taiwan’s Powerchip Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation plant in the western Indian state of Dholera is targeting to roll out its first batch of chips in December. Tata also signed a US$11 billion memorandum of understanding with Dutch technology giant ASML on May 16 to make advanced chips for industries ranging from car manufacturing to AI.

In for the long-term

Analysts say that building a semiconductor industry ecosystem requires strong implementation and planning over the long term because it needs a complex value chain divided into design, fabrication, as well as assembly and testing.

“Establishing a complete semiconductor ecosystem is a marathon, not a sprint,” said Anndy Lian, a Singapore-based adviser to governments on information technology systems.

He suggested that India build not only fabrication units for complex microchips and integrated circuits but also downstream systems to handle back-end processing after they are made. “These are less capital-intensive and faster to operationalise than fabs, allowing the country to build a skilled workforce and supplier network while major fabs remain under construction.”

Hard infrastructure is also vital because highly sensitive semiconductor manufacturing needs pure water, uninterrupted power and specialised chemicals. “A single voltage fluctuation can ruin a wafer batch. India must create plug-and-play industrial parks where utilities are guaranteed to international standards, not just promised,” Lian said.

Though India has lagged behind in semiconductor manufacturing such as the US, China and Taiwan, it has a strategic advantage because it has been a hub for semiconductor research and design. It has the world’s largest pool of chip design engineers – but lacks fab-floor operators – responsible for day-to-day manufacturing of silicon wafers – and process engineers who transform raw silicon into working microchips.

Bolstering its large talent pool would be a crucial “secret weapon” for India in gaining a competitive edge, Lian said, urging public-private partnerships with universities offering specialised semiconductor curricula. “The goal should be to move from Make in India to Engineer in India.”

According to a report by government think tank NITI Aayong in May, India imports 90 to 95 per cent of its semiconductors. This dependence could become a major economic and strategic vulnerability as domestic demand is projected to exceed US$200 billion by 2035.

India’s Information Technology Minister Aswini Vaishnaw told reporters earlier this month that the country had set a target of developing 100,000 engineers for the semiconductor industry. The global semiconductor industry is projected to face a shortage of about 1 million workers by 2032.

India has already achieved its target of developing 85,000 semiconductor engineers in four years, against a target timeline of 10 years, according to the minister. Semiconductor design programmes are now offered in 355 universities across India, including institutions in smaller towns and cities.

Chip consciousness

In addition, the federal government runs programmes subsidising up to 50 per cent of project costs for semiconductor manufacturing, supplemented by support from state governments.

Indian policymakers were conscious about the criticality of semiconductors in technology systems, said Sunil Sinha, an economics professor at the Institute for Development and Communication in Chandigarh.

“That is why there is a serious effort to increase semiconductor production in India. Still, the issue is not just production of chips but what generation chips you are producing. Is it something on which AI can ride upon?” he asked.

Raj Kapoor, founder and CEO of India Blockchain Alliance said that the second phase of India’s semiconductor mission showed there was growing recognition that the challenge would be to not just build fabrication facilities but an entire ecosystem to support them.

While the Tata-ASML agreement showed India’s intent for advanced chipmaking, the true test would be translating that into access for the country’s longer-term semiconductor ambitions, he said.

India’s strategy is notably different from the technological race pursued by the global semiconductor leaders to produce cutting-edge chips. Delhi appeared more focused on manufacturing chips where “demand remains substantial and barriers to entry are lower”, Kapoor said.

Still, Sinha said, even the most basic chips would have a significant economic impact because that meant local industries would not need to import them.

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Anndy Lian is an early blockchain adopter and experienced serial entrepreneur who is known for his work in the government sector. He is a best selling book author. The latest book is Web4: The Age of Autonomous Intelligence.

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Beyond payments: India aims to architect Indonesia’s digital future

Beyond payments: India aims to architect Indonesia’s digital future
India’s wildly popular digital payments system, which began as a way for people to send money instantly by phone, could help the country turn one of its biggest domestic technology successes into a tool of diplomacy, analysts say.
That opportunity is coming into focus in Indonesia, Southeast Asia’s largest economy, where officials are studying whether India’s low-cost digital systems can be adapted to their own needs.

The talks centre on the Unified Payments Interface (UPI), India’s instant payment system launched about a decade ago that has become one of the most visible parts of the country’s digital transformation.

New Delhi has already signed agreements with several nations, including Singapore, to facilitate cross-border payments, but analysts say Jakarta’s interest appears to go further.

According to a report in The Times of India on Monday, Indonesia is looking at India’s broader digital public infrastructure as a possible blueprint for building its own sovereign system. Several Indonesian delegations have also recently visited India to study public policy initiatives as Jakarta seeks to strengthen food security and healthcare services.

Anndy Lian, a Singapore-based adviser to governments on blockchain and information technology, said a successful digital collaboration between India and Indonesia could serve as a “massive proof of concept for the Global South, particularly within Asean”.

“Many developing nations are actively seeking alternatives to expensive, proprietary Western financial networks or heavily centralised systems,” he said.

“By demonstrating that scalable, open-protocol digital ecosystems can be successfully adapted across borders, India and Indonesia are establishing a highly attractive sovereign blueprint for digital transformation.”

Indonesia has formally set a target to become a global digital economic leader by 2045, aligning with its centennial milestone.

Lian cautioned, however, that a collaboration between India and Indonesia would require incorporating safeguards because adopting systems across different regulatory environments carried risks such as data privacy breaches and cybersecurity vulnerabilities.

“Second, there is the risk of ‘model mismatch’. India’s solutions are tailored to its specific demographic and bureaucratic realities, which may not translate perfectly to other nations without rigorous localisation,” he added.

Over-reliance on a single foreign partner for core digital infrastructure could also raise long-term “technological sovereignty concerns”, Lian said, urging countries to carefully balance digital efficiency with technological independence.

UPI has anchored a digital revolution in India that has helped bring large sections of its teeming population into a formal economy. Indian nationals can now access a range of welfare programmes through digital infrastructure, including the sharing of medical records.

Lian said India could leverage its digital initiative across Asia as it would enable millions of Indian tourists to make payments when visiting countries such as Indonesia, and also create a financial pipeline for Indian businesses and investors operating in Southeast Asia.

“Geopolitically, this elevates India from a participant in the global digital economy to a primary architect of its infrastructure. This is not merely about payments; it is a vector for exporting India’s broader tech ecosystem,” he said.

India’s digital services have expanded beyond its traditional bread-and-butter IT ones in the last five to six years to include fintech start-ups, cybersecurity firms and other enterprises.

“Beijing will undoubtedly view the India-Indonesia digital alignment as a strategic encroachment on its sphere of technological influence,” Lian said.

“India’s digital diplomacy is undeniably strengthening as it pivots from merely exporting technology to providing comprehensive governance blueprints.”

By sharing foundational digital frameworks like UPI and Aadhaar, a national digital identity base, India could offer peer-tested solutions, he said.

Jamus Lim, an associate professor of economics at the ESSEC Business School, noted that many back-end systems in the region already relied on Indian technical expertise.

“There are natural network effects that will reward first movers that establish the industry standard,” he said, adding that the faster India was able to roll out agreements using its standards, the better its position would be for South-South partnerships and agreements.

Raj Kapoor, president of India Blockchain Alliance, said leveraging its digital public infrastructure had become “arguably India’s most distinctive soft-power asset right now, because it’s cheap to export and it plays well as South-South solidarity”.

“Historically, countries exported infrastructure through roads, ports and power plants. Today, nations increasingly export digital infrastructure. India is emerging as one of the few countries capable of exporting an entire governance,” he said.

India should see collaboration in UPI “not as the destination, but as the opening chapter”, Kapoor said.

“We should use Indonesia as the flagship Asean case study to accelerate parallel talks with Vietnam, the Philippines, and others as first-mover advantage matters in standards-setting.”

 

Source: https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/economics/article/3359736/beyond-payments-india-aims-architect-indonesias-digital-future

 

Anndy Lian is an early blockchain adopter and experienced serial entrepreneur who is known for his work in the government sector. He is a best selling book author. The latest book is Web4: The Age of Autonomous Intelligence.

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