Fear Is High and Longs Got Flushed. Bitcoin Near a 12-Week Low. Is $70,000 the Next Line in the Sand?

Fear Is High and Longs Got Flushed. Bitcoin Near a 12-Week Low. Is $70,000 the Next Line in the Sand?

My point of view is straightforward. The recent Bitcoin drop looks like a macro-led repricing with a leverage amplifier, not a Bitcoin-only failure. Bitcoin fell 3.45% to $71,425.63 in 24 hours and traded near a reported 12-week low. The broader crypto market fell 2.66% to $2.39 trillion. Bitcoin underperformed the wider market and became the main drag. 

The primary force came from higher U.S. yields. A market recap on November 12 said hotter inflation pushed the U.S. 10-year yield above 5% as traders priced in more Fed hikes. That recap put Bitcoin down 4.3% near $71,400. The TLDR snapshot put Bitcoin down 3.45% to $71,425.63. The 2 snapshots differ slightly, and they point in the same direction. Higher yields can make speculative assets less attractive. Bitcoin’s outsized decline pulled the wider crypto market lower. Markets reacted to Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang’s reported departure and uncertainty about potential selling tied to Strategy’s planned MSCI index removal. Those items remain reported market concerns, not proof of a single cause. 

The secondary force came from liquidations. Bitcoin long liquidations reached $252.84 million in 24 hours, up sharply from the prior period. Forced closures can add sell orders and deepen a decline. Liquidation data reflects and amplifies selling pressure. It does not establish the original cause. Market sentiment remained fearful, and major crypto sectors were down. That broad weakness supports the view that selling spread beyond Bitcoin. I treat the liquidation figure as evidence of leverage stress. The root cause looks more like higher yields and a market-wide move away from speculative assets. That distinction matters for the near term. A leverage flush can end once forced positions clear. A macro repricing can last longer if yields keep pressing speculative assets.

The 97% correlation with Gold strengthens my macro-first reading. A strong correlation between crypto and Gold indicates a shared macro repricing. I do not take that correlation as proof of causation, and I would not overstate it. It weakens the case for a Bitcoin-only narrative. If Bitcoin and Gold move together under yield pressure, the more reasonable explanation is a common macro driver, not a crypto-specific event. That is why I see the Nvidia and Strategy headlines as reported concerns that added uncertainty. They did not serve as confirmed triggers. The market recap put Bitcoin down 4.3% near $71,400, and the broader crypto market fell 2.66%, so Bitcoin’s drop was a larger force in the move. The market-wide weakness also tells me that traders reduced risk across crypto.

Near-term momentum looks weak. Bitcoin sits below the $73,936 daily pivot, and the reported 24-hour low was around $71,200. If Bitcoin holds near $71,200, it could attempt a rebound toward the pivot. A break below $70,000 risks extending losses. The total crypto market cap sits at $2.39 trillion, which is also the stated pivot level. If the market cap holds near $2.39 trillion and Bitcoin stabilizes, losses could ease. Continued yield pressure or a break below that level would keep downside risk elevated. I would watch whether Bitcoin selling and long liquidations cool. I would not treat oversold readings alone as proof of a bottom. Stabilization needs demand and calmer leverage.

The next daily U.S. spot Bitcoin ETF flow report is a useful demand check. If flows improve and the market holds $2.39 trillion, selling pressure could fade. If flows stay weak alongside continued yield pressure, the outlook weakens. I also mark Strategy’s planned MSCI index removal on November 30, 2026 as a future watch item. The available material does not confirm a Bitcoin sale tied to that change. The potential selling impact remains uncertain. Any confirmed flows around the November 30 index change would matter more than headlines. The Nvidia CEO departure concern and the Strategy index concern both sit in the reported-concern category. They do not sit in the confirmed-catalyst category. I would keep that distinction clear when judging the next move.

My conclusion is that bearish pressure persists. Market-wide weakness and heavy long liquidations help explain the drop. The available evidence does not establish 1 definitive catalyst. The key watch over the next 24 to 48 hours is whether Bitcoin can hold above $71,200 and recover the $73,936 pivot. 

The overall volume is not looking good. There is a high chance that it will fall below $69,000 in the next few hours. Tough times ahead.

https://e27.co/fear-is-high-and-longs-got-flushed-is-us70000-the-next-line-in-the-sand-20261113/

 

Anndy Lian is an early blockchain adopter and experienced serial entrepreneur who is known for his work in the government sector. He is a best selling book author. The latest book is Web4: The Age of Autonomous Intelligence.

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What If China’s AI Crash Was A Feature, Not A Bug?

What If China’s AI Crash Was A Feature, Not A Bug?

The great artificial intelligence debate of our time usually focuses on who will win the race for the most powerful model. A far more revealing question sits underneath the surface. Which country is building a healthier, more durable market structure around this technology? On that front, the evidence points in a surprising direction. China is playing a better long-term game, even though its stock market took a sharp hit first.

Wall Street loves a good American exceptionalism narrative. The story goes that the United States boasts the deepest capital markets, the most advanced chips, and a culture of relentless innovation that China simply cannot match. That story contains real truth, but it misses a crucial nuance. The United States has built a dangerously narrow AI ecosystem that depends on a handful of corporate giants. By contrast, China absorbed a severe financial shock and emerged with a strategy that prioritizes industrial diffusion and global market share over speculative stock prices.

Let us start with the American setup. The U.S. AI boom rests on a concentration of capital and corporate power that is unprecedented in modern financial history. A handful of hyperscalers, led by Microsoft, Alphabet, Amazon, and Meta, are pouring hundreds of billions of dollars into data centers and computing infrastructure.

The equity market has become the broader economy’s growth engine. Rising AI profits lift share prices; higher share prices boost wealthy households’ spending power; and that spending keeps demand alive. This works beautifully as long as confidence holds, but it leaves the entire system vulnerable to a single point of failure. The top 10 S&P 500 stocks are the most concentrated they’ve been since 1965. Investors pay roughly 22 times forward earnings for the index, well above its long-term average, and AI-linked names trade at far richer multiples. When an index depends on a tiny group of companies to justify its valuation, the risk of a sudden repricing never disappears. It simply waits.

Now consider China’s path. The Chinese AI stock sector saw a sharp correction that wiped out roughly $480 billion. The STAR50 index, which tracks the country’s leading AI and semiconductor firms, plunged over 40% from its July peak. Even after that sell-off, the index traded at around 100 times trailing earnings, down from nearly 250 times. Retail investors fueled that rally with margin financing and short-term speculation. When sentiment shifted, the unwinding happened quickly. Beijing did not engineer that crash. No government deliberately vaporizes $500 billion in household wealth. The business model that triggered the correction reflects a deliberate and coherent strategic choice.

That choice centers on open-weight artificial intelligence. Labs such as DeepSeek, Alibaba, and Moonshot have released powerful models that anyone can download, modify, and run on their own servers. This approach contrasts with the closed-source, subscription-based models favored by OpenAI and Anthropic. The strategic logic is straightforward. If a developer in Nairobi, Lagos, or Jakarta can access a capable model from China for free, the pricing power of Western AI giants erodes.

Open-weight systems from China accounted for 17.1% of global AI model downloads through August 2025, edging out the U.S. share of 15.86%. On Hugging Face, the world’s leading open-source AI community, architectures from China captured 41% of all downloads by mid-2026. Alibaba’s Qwen ecosystem has birthed over 300,000 derivative models created by developers worldwide. Cumulative downloads of open-source large language models from China crossed 10 billion globally. These are not the metrics of a bubble. They reflect a platform strategy.

The Chinese government actively supports this diffusion. State-backed investors have even sold into domestic rallies to temper speculative excess, favoring long-term industrial utility over short-term financial mania. Beijing wants cheap, efficient AI embedded in manufacturing, logistics, and supply chains, not a bloated software stock bubble that enriches day traders while starving the real economy. China’s manufacturing base gives it an application advantage. The country accounts for roughly 30% of global manufacturing output, and that scale offers a ready testing ground for factory automation, robotics, and logistics software.

The short-term pain is real. Startups in China are bleeding cash as third-party cloud providers capture much of the end-user revenue. Z.ai’s share of its own model’s tokens that a major platform served plunged from 88% to 22% within 20 days of release, as rival hosts undercut its pricing. Financial returns for individual labs remain uncertain. Strategic returns for China’s broader economy and global influence are substantial.

The United States is not standing still on hardware. Washington continues to restrict China’s access to advanced chips, and those restrictions bite. Huawei plans to double production of its top-tier Ascend 910C chip to roughly 600,000 units in 2026, but Nvidia’s best chips still deliver around 4 times the computing power of Huawei’s best offerings. Bernstein estimates that China’s AI computing capacity stood at just 14% of America’s in 2025, and that gap will persist for years. China compensates for hardware weakness with software strength and industrial scale. The country is aggressively replacing foreign chips with domestic alternatives and forcing state-funded data centers to transition to homegrown silicon. DeepSeek’s founder has argued that domestic AI chips lag the U.S. by only about 2 years. The core constraint is production capacity, not fundamental design capability.

The deeper divergence lies in global outreach. The United States ties AI exports, cloud access, and investment to political and security alignment. It builds walls around its technology and expects allies to operate within those walls. China courts the Global South with open-source technology transfers, digital infrastructure, and low-cost AI stacks. It does not demand political loyalty. It offers capability. For a developer in an emerging market who cannot afford an expensive subscription to a Western model, a free Chinese model that runs on local hardware isn’t a compromise. It is a lifeline. This inclusive approach builds grassroots adoption, and adoption creates dependency, standards, and long-term influence.

The American AI trade may not crash tomorrow. Corporate balance sheets are strong, and institutional capital moves more slowly than retail margin debt. The structural vulnerabilities are real, though. The U.S. market depends on a narrow group of companies to justify extraordinary valuations amid rising capital costs and uncertain returns.

China has already taken its medicine. It absorbed a sharp correction, disciplined speculative excess, and doubled down on a strategy that prioritizes widespread adoption over exclusive monetization. That strategy may not produce the strongest quarterly earnings reports. It may not generate the kind of stock market euphoria Silicon Valley celebrates. It builds something more durable. It builds an ecosystem. In the long run, ecosystems outlast bubbles.

https://www.benzinga.com/opinion/26/11/62784540/what-if-china-ai-crash-was-a-feature-not-a-bug

 

Anndy Lian is an early blockchain adopter and experienced serial entrepreneur who is known for his work in the government sector. He is a best selling book author. The latest book is Web4: The Age of Autonomous Intelligence.

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South Korea’s Crypto Tax Is Delayed Again. That’s a Good Thing.

South Korea’s Crypto Tax Is Delayed Again. That’s a Good Thing.

South Korea’s approach to digital assets has developed a familiar rhythm. The government announces an ambitious reform. The cryptocurrency industry pushes back. Lawmakers debate the consequences. Then the deadline slips. The pattern has repeated itself for years, but the latest postponement carries greater significance.

With the Digital Asset Basic Act (DABA) still taking shape, South Korea faces a fundamental question: Should it begin taxing cryptocurrency gains before establishing the regulatory infrastructure necessary to administer those taxes fairly?

The government has now offered its answer. On November 5, Finance Minister Lee Hyoung-il announced plans to postpone cryptocurrency taxation from January 2027 to 2029, marking the fourth proposed delay since lawmakers first approved the tax framework in 2020. The decision still requires legislative approval, but it reflects a growing recognition that taxation cannot function effectively without a coherent regulatory foundation.

The Financial Services Commission (FSC) has been working toward a comprehensive framework for digital assets, with officials indicating that consultations on DABA are approaching their final stages. The legislation is intended to establish clearer legal definitions, licensing requirements for digital asset businesses, and rules governing stablecoin issuance. In principle, these reforms would provide the structural clarity South Korea’s cryptocurrency market has needed for years. In practice, however, the legislation has become entangled in disagreements over how extensively the government should regulate a rapidly evolving industry.

Consider the stablecoin provisions. The Bank of Korea has advocated a framework under which commercial banks would hold at least 51 percent ownership of won-denominated stablecoin issuers, effectively giving traditional financial institutions a controlling stake. Reserve requirements intended to ensure that stablecoins remain fully backed have also featured prominently in the debate. Central bankers argue that such safeguards are necessary to preserve financial stability, while industry representatives warn that bank-dominated issuance could stifle innovation and limit competition. The ownership requirement remains a subject of debate rather than a settled legislative obligation.

Meanwhile, the government is expanding its oversight of cryptocurrency transfers across national borders. Amendments to the Foreign Exchange Transactions Act, scheduled to take effect on December 3, will establish registration and reporting requirements for businesses facilitating cross-border digital asset transfers. The changes are designed to strengthen oversight of international transactions and close regulatory gaps that have allowed some activity to escape conventional financial reporting systems.

Under the revised framework, covered virtual asset service providers will need to register with the relevant authorities and establish systems for reporting cross-border transaction information. Exchanges and other affected businesses must also develop the technical infrastructure necessary to connect with the government’s foreign exchange monitoring network. These requirements carry substantial operational consequences, forcing platforms to invest in compliance systems while adapting to a regulatory environment that is still evolving.

That is precisely why the timing of cryptocurrency taxation matters. Under the existing legislation, South Korea was scheduled to impose a 22 percent tax, including local income tax, on annual digital asset gains exceeding 2.5 million won, approximately $1,870. Lawmakers originally approved the measure in December 2020, with implementation planned for 2022. The deadline subsequently moved to 2023, then 2025, and eventually 2027.

Each postponement reflected a similar concern: the infrastructure was incomplete, the regulatory framework remained uncertain, and investors and exchanges needed more time to prepare. Those concerns have not disappeared. Indeed, the government’s latest proposal suggests they have become more difficult to ignore.

The scale of South Korea’s cryptocurrency market makes the issue especially consequential. Digital assets have attracted substantial participation from individual investors, while trading remains heavily concentrated among a handful of domestic platforms. Upbit and Bithumb dominate much of the country’s exchange activity, giving their reporting capabilities considerable importance to any national cryptocurrency taxation system.

Such concentration creates an obvious vulnerability. If a small number of platforms handle the overwhelming majority of domestic trading, deficiencies in their tax-reporting infrastructure could affect millions of investors. The government cannot reasonably assume that exchanges will be able to calculate and transmit accurate tax information simply because a statutory deadline has arrived.

Nor is the challenge limited to recording profitable transactions. A workable taxation system must establish acquisition costs, calculate gains and losses across assets, apply the annual deduction, and determine how transactions conducted before implementation should be treated. It must also confront more complicated questions involving decentralized finance, cryptocurrency airdrops, staking rewards, and transfers between domestic and overseas platforms.

These are not minor administrative details. They determine whether investors can calculate their liabilities accurately and whether the National Tax Service can enforce the law consistently. Without clear rules, taxpayers risk facing contradictory interpretations, unexpected liabilities, and compliance requirements that differ depending on where their assets are held.

International reporting presents another complication. South Korea is preparing to participate in the OECD’s Crypto-Asset Reporting Framework, which facilitates the exchange of cryptocurrency transaction information between tax authorities. But implementation schedules differ across jurisdictions. Although South Korea is among the countries preparing to exchange information beginning in 2027, comparable arrangements involving the United States are not expected to begin until 2029.

That discrepancy has become central to the government’s position. Taxing investors who use domestic exchanges while lacking equivalent access to information about overseas transactions could produce uneven enforcement. Investors trading through South Korean platforms would face greater scrutiny than those conducting similar transactions abroad, undermining the principle of equal treatment.

The government has therefore proposed using the additional two years to improve reporting systems, clarify taxation rules, and coordinate with international information-sharing arrangements. Officials also plan to establish a public-private working group to address unresolved questions and simplify compliance.

Another proposed reform would allow cryptocurrency investors to carry forward losses for up to three years, enabling them to offset those losses against subsequent gains. Such a provision would address an important weakness in the existing system, under which losses from previous tax years could not be deducted from future cryptocurrency profits.

These changes matter because fairness requires more than applying the same nominal tax rate to everyone. It also requires accurate reporting, predictable enforcement, and rules that account for the volatility of digital asset markets. A tax system that ignores those conditions risks imposing disproportionate burdens on investors whose transactions happen to be easier for authorities to monitor.

The political implications are equally difficult to ignore. Cryptocurrency has become an important investment vehicle for younger South Koreans, many of whom face an unforgiving housing market, substantial household debt, and limited opportunities for traditional wealth accumulation. Digital assets offer no guarantee of financial security, and their volatility can produce devastating losses. Nevertheless, their popularity reflects broader anxieties about economic mobility and the accessibility of conventional investment opportunities.

For politicians, imposing a poorly prepared tax on these investors would carry obvious risks. The next parliamentary elections are expected in 2028, making cryptocurrency taxation an issue with potential electoral consequences. But the policy case for postponement should not depend on whether a particular group of investors constitutes an attractive voting bloc.

The more compelling argument is institutional. Governments have a responsibility to collect taxes, but they also have an obligation to ensure that taxation is comprehensible, enforceable, and reasonably consistent across comparable transactions. A system that cannot reliably distinguish taxable gains from transfers, account for losses, or capture overseas activity falls short of that standard.

None of this means cryptocurrency gains should remain untaxed indefinitely. Income should generally be subject to taxation, and investors in digital assets should not receive preferential treatment simply because their investments involve newer technologies. Exempting cryptocurrency from taxation while taxing conventional financial assets would raise legitimate questions about equity.

But there is a difference between accepting the principle of taxation and rushing to implement a system that is not prepared to administer it. The Digital Asset Basic Act is intended to provide the regulatory blueprint. Taxation should complement that framework, not race ahead of it.

South Korea now has an opportunity to put those pieces in the right order. It can finalize its digital asset legislation, resolve disputes over stablecoin regulation, establish credible reporting infrastructure, and coordinate enforcement with international partners. It can also use the proposed postponement to ensure that investors understand their obligations before those obligations become legally enforceable.

The additional time must not become another excuse for bureaucratic inertia. Four postponements expose a troubling inability to translate legislative ambition into administrative readiness. The government should establish measurable milestones, publish clear implementation guidance, and hold regulators and industry participants accountable for meeting them.

Still, recognizing that a policy is not ready is preferable to implementing it merely to avoid political embarrassment. South Korea’s objective should be a credible and sustainable cryptocurrency tax regime, not the symbolic satisfaction of finally meeting a deadline.

A fourth delay may look like another failure of political will. Properly used, however, it could demonstrate something considerably more valuable: a willingness to acknowledge regulatory reality before asking investors to bear the consequences of ignoring it.

https://intpolicydigest.org/south-korea-s-crypto-tax-is-delayed-again-that-s-a-good-thing/

 

Anndy Lian is an early blockchain adopter and experienced serial entrepreneur who is known for his work in the government sector. He is a best selling book author. The latest book is Web4: The Age of Autonomous Intelligence.

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